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Abstract We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: per-
missibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexico-
graphic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we
give two groups of characterizations. The first group characterizes permissibility and
proper rationalizability. The second group characterizes permissibility in an alterna-
tive way and iterated admissibility. In each group, the conditions for the latter are
stronger than those for the former, which corresponds to the fact that proper rational-
izability and iterated admissibility are two (compatible) refinements of permissibility
within the complete information framework. The intrinsic difference between the two
groups are the role of rationality: the first group does not need it, while the second
group does
Keywords epistemic game theory · incomplete information · lexicographic belief ·
permissibility · proper rationalizability · iterated admissibility
1 Introduction
The purpose of noncooperative game theory is to study an individual’s decision mak-
ing in an interactive situation. Since there one’s payoff is not completely determined
The author would like to express her gratitude to Andre´s Perea for his thorough reading of the early
versions of this paper and his numerous valuable comments and suggestions. She also would like to
thank Ja´nos Flesch, Funaki Yukihiko, Christian Bach, Abraham Neyman, Zsombor Z. Me´der, and Dmitriy
Kvasov for their valuable discussions and encouragements. She thanks all teachers and students in the 4th
Epicenter Spring Course on Epistemic Game Theory in Maastricht University for their inspiring teaching
and stimulating discussions. She gratefully acknowledge the support of Grant-in-Aids for Young Scientists
(B) of JSPS No.17K13707 and Grant for Special Research Project No. 2017K-016 of Waseda University.
Shuige Liu
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-Ku, 169-
8050, Tokyo, Japan
E-mail: shuige liu@aoni.waseda.jp
2 Shuige Liu
by her own choice, decision making requires her to form a belief on every other par-
ticipant’s choice, on every other participant’s belief on every other’s choice, and so
on. Studying the structure of those belief hierarchies and choices supported by a be-
lief hierarchy satisfying some particular conditions opened up a field called epistemic
game theory. See Perea (2002) for a textbook on this field.
In epistemic game theory, various concepts have been developed to describe spe-
cific belief structures. One is lexicographic belief (Blume et al. 1991a, 1991b). A
lexicographic belief describes a player’s subjective conjecture about the opponents’
behavior by a sequence of probability distributions over other participants’ choices
and types, which is different from the adoption of a single probability distribution
in a standard probabilistic belief. The interpretation of a lexicographic belief is that
every choice-type pair in the sequence is considered to be possible, while a pair oc-
curring ahead in the sequence is deemed infinitely more likely than one occurring
later. Several concepts have been developed by putting various conditions on lexico-
graphic beliefs intended to capture different styles of reasoning about the opponents’
behavior. Permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility are three
important and interrelated concepts among them.
Permissibility originated from Selten (1975)’s perfect equilibrium. It is defined
and studied from the epistemic viewpoint by using lexicographic belief hierarchy in
Brandenburger (1992) (an alternative approach without using lexicographic belief is
given by Bo¨rgers, 1994). Permissibility is based on two notions: caution and primary
belief in the opponents’ rationality. A lexicographic belief is said to be cautious if it
does not exclude any choice of the opponents; it is said to primarily believe in the
opponents’ rationality if its first level belief only deems possible those choice-type
pairs where the choice is optimal under the belief of the paired type (Perea, 2012).
Proper rationalizability originated from Myerson (1978)’s proper equilibrium
which is intended to be a refinement of perfect equilibrium. It is defined and studied
in Schuhmacher (1999) and Asheim (2001) as an epistemic concept. Proper rational-
izability shares with permissibility the notion of caution, while, instead of primary
belief in the opponents’ rationality, it is based on a stronger notion called respecting
the opponents’ preferenceswhich means that a “better” choice always occurs in front
of a “worse” choice in a lexicographic belief.
Iterated admissibility originated from the study of iteratively undominated choices
(Bernheim, 1984, Pearce, 1984, Samuelson, 1992). In Brandenburger et al. (2008)
and Perea (2012) it is explored as an epistemic concept by using lexicographic belief
hierarchy. It is based on caution and a notion called assumption of rationality, which
is also stronger than primary belief in the opponents’ rationality. A lexicographic be-
lief is said to assume the opponents’ rationality if every “good” choice occurs and
is always located in front of any “bad” one. Here good means that a choice of the
opponent can be supported by a cautious belief of her, and bad means the opposite.
We illustrate the three concepts by two examples.
Example 1.1 (Permissibility and proper rationalizability) Consider a game where
player 1 has strategies A and B and player 2 has strategies C,D, and E. Player 2’s
utility function u2 is illustrated in Table 1. Consider a lexicographic belief of player
1 on player 2’s choices. Caution requires that all three choices of player 2 occur in
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Table 1 A two-person game for permissibility and proper rationalizability
u2 C D E
A 3 2 1
B 3 2 1
Table 2 A two-person game for iterated admissibility
u2 C D E
A 3 2 1
B 3 2 4
that belief. Since C is player 2’s most preferred choice, primary belief in player 2’s
rationality requires that only choice C can be put in the first level. Further, since
player 2 prefers C to D and D to E , a lexicographic belief of player 1 respecting 2’s
preferences should deemC infinitely more likely than D and D infinitely more likely
than E, that is, putC before D and D before E .
Example 1.2 (Iterated admissibility) Consider u2 illustrated in Table 2 which is
obtained from the one in Example 1.1 by changing u2(B,E) from 1 to 4. Here, C
could be optimal for player 2 if she believes that player 1 will use choice A, and E
could be optimal if she believes player 1 would use choice B, while D could never be
optimal whatever player 2 believes about player 1’s choices. Hence, a lexicographic
belief of player 1 assuming player 2’s rationality should deemC and E infinitely more
likely than D.
One motivation for developing lexicographic belief is to alleviate the tension be-
tween caution and rationality (Blume et al., 1991a, Brandenburger, 1992, Bo¨rgers,
1994, Samuelson, 1992, Bo¨rgers and Samuelson, 1994). All the three concepts tried
to solve the tension by sacrificing rationality in different ways. Indeed, permissibility
requires that the first level belief contains only rational choices, proper rationalizabil-
ity requires that choices should be ordered according to the level of rationality, and
iterated admissibility requires that choices which could be rational to be put in front
of those which can never be. However, due to caution all allow occurrences of irra-
tional choices. This sacrifice of rationality brought conceptual inconvenience since
rationality is a basic assumption in game theory and is reasonable to be adopted as a
criterion for each player’s belief.
There is an approach which solves the tension without sacrificing rationality: us-
ing an incomplete information framework. That is, instead of considering the uncer-
tainty about the opponents’ rationality within a complete information framework, we
take the uncertainty about the opponents’ utility functions and consider types within
the incomplete information framework. Then the occurrence of a irrational choice
can be explained as that the “real” utility function of an opponent is different from
the original one. Permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility can
all be characterized within an incomplete information framework. This is the basic
idea of this paper.
We use the above examples to explain this idea.
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Table 3 Alternative utility functions for player 2
v2 C D E
A 2 3 1
B 2 3 1
v′2 C D E
A 2 1 3
B 2 1 3
Table 4 An alternative utility function for player 2
w2 C D E
A 3 5 4
B 3 5 1
Example 1.1 (Continued) As mentioned before, though only choiceC is rational for
player 2, caution requires D and E to occur in player 1’s belief as well. In a com-
plete information framework, the occurrences of D and E are explained by player
2’s irrationality (i.e., “trembling hand”). In contrast, within an incomplete informa-
tion framework they are explained by the possibility that the “real” utility function of
player 2 is not u2 but v2 or v
′
2 in Table 3. Choice D is optimal in v2 and E is optimal
in v′2. In this manner, uncertainty about the opponent’s rationality within a complete
information framework is transformed into uncertainty about the opponent’s real util-
ity function within an incomplete information framework. It can be seen that primary
belief in the opponent’s rationality in complete information framework is equivalent
to the condition that one deems u2 or a utility function “very similar” to u2 infinitely
more likely to be the real utility function of player 2 than v2 and v
′
2, and respecting
the opponent’s preferences is equivalent to the condition that those alternative utility
functions should be ordered by their “similarity” to u2.
Example 1.2 (Continued) Since both C and E can be optimal in the original game,
we only need a game to support choice D. Consider that the “real” utility function
for player 2 is w2 illustrated in Table 4. Choice D is optimal in w2. It can be seen that
assumption of player 2’s rationality corresponds to that those utility function different
from the original one to be less likely to the original one.
In this paper, we study the equivalences between conditions in complete and in-
complete information models for 2-person static games and provide characteriza-
tions of permissibility, proper rationalizability, and assumption of rationality. First,
we define the lexicographic epistemic model of a game with incomplete information.
Then we give our characterization results which are separated into two groups. In
the first group, we characterize permissibility and proper rationalizability, showing
that a choice is permissible (properly rationalizable) within a complete information
framework if and only if it is optimal for a belief hierarchy within the correspond-
ing incomplete information framework that expresses common full belief in caution,
primary belief in the opponent’s utilities nearest to the original utilities (the oppo-
nent’s utilities are centered around the original utilities), and a best (better) choice is
supported by utilities nearest (nearer) to the original ones.
In the second group, we characterize permissibility in an alternative way and
iterated admissibility, showing that a choice is permissible (iteratively admissible)
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within a complete information model if and only there is a belief hierarchy within the
corresponding incomplete information framework that expresses common full belief
of caution, rationality, and primary belief in the original utilities (prior assumption
of the original utilities and every good choice is supported). We will further show in
Section 5.5 that caution can be weakened in this group of characterizations.
Both proper rationalizability and iterated admissibility are refinements of permis-
sibility (Perea, 2012). This can also be seen in the characterizations within the in-
complete information models: in each group, each conditions for the latter is stronger
than its counterpart for the former. The intrinsic difference between the two groups
are the role of rationality: the first group does not need it , while the second group
does. Nevertheless, we can construct a belief hierarchy which satisfies rationality and
conditions in the first group. This corresponds to the fact that, within an complete
information framework, it is always possible to have a belief hierarchy satisfying the
conditions of proper rationalizability as well as those of iterated admissibility.
This paper is not the first one characterizing concepts in epistemic game theory
within the incomplete information framework. Perea and Roy (2017) characterized
ε-proper rationalizability in this approach by using a standard epistemic model with-
out lexicographic beliefs. They showed that a type in a standard epistemic model
with complete information expresses common full belief in caution and ε-trembling
condition if and only if there is a type in the corresponding model with incomplete
information sharing the same belief hierarchy with it which expresses common belief
in caution, ε-centered belief around the original utilities u, and belief in rationality
under the closest utility function. Since each properly rationalizable choice is the
limit of a sequence of ε-proper rationalizable ones, the conditions adopted in their
characterizations are very useful for us. Two conditions in our characterization of
proper rationalizability, that is, caution and u-centered belief, are faithful translations
of their conditions into lexicographic model. However, the most critical condition
in their characterization, that is, belief in rationality under the closest utility func-
tion, is impossible to be adopted here. The reason is, as will be shown in Section
3.1, that a nearest utility function making a choice optimal does not always exist in
lexicographic models. This is a salient difference between standard probabilistic be-
liefs and lexicographic ones. We define a weaker condition called “a better choice
is supported by utilities nearer to the original one” and show that it can be used to
characterize proper rationalizability.
Another essential difference between Perea and Roy (2017) and this paper is in
the way of proof. Equivalence of belief hierarchies generated by types in models
with complete and incomplete informations and type morphisms (Bo¨ge and Eisele,
1979, Heifetz and Samet, 1998, Perea and Kets, 2016) play important roles in Perea
and Roy (2017)’s proof. In contrast, our proofs are based on constructing a specific
correspondence between the two models. We show that conditions in a type of one
model implies that appropriate conditions are satisfied in the corresponding type in
the constructed model. Equivalence of hierarchies follows directly by construction.
Our construction can also be used to prove Perea and Roy (2017)’s Theorem 6.1.
Further, as will be discussed in Section 5.3, our construction shows that rationality is
separable from other conditions in characterizing proper rationalizability. This con-
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firms that the consistency of caution and rationality within an incomplete information
framework.
Our results, as well as Perea and Roy (2017)’s, also provide insights in decision
theory and general epistemology. They imply that any choice permissible, properly
rationalizable, or iteratively admissible within a complete information framework is
also optimal for a belief satisfying corresponding conditions within an incomplete
information framework, and vice versa. In other words, by just looking at the out-
come, it is impossible to know the accurate epistemic situation behind the choice,
that is, whether it is because of players’ uncertainty about the opponents’ rationality
or uncertainty about what are the real utilities of the opponents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines permissibility,
proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility in epistemic models with complete
information. Section 3 introduces the lexicographic epistemic model with incomplete
information and defines two groups of conditions on the types in such a model. Sec-
tion 4 gives two groups of characterizations and their proofs. Section 5 gives some
concluding remarks. Section 6 contains the proofs of all lemmas.
2 Epistemic Model with Complete Information
In this section, we give a survey of lexicographic epistemic model with complete
information. Definitions here follow Perea (2012), Chapters 5-7.
Consider a finite 2-person static game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I where I = {1,2} is the set
of players, Ci is the finite set of choices and ui :C1×C2 → R is the utility function
for player i ∈ I. In the following sometimes we denote C1×C2 by C. We assume
that each player has a lexicographic belief on the opponent’s choices, a lexicographic
belief on the opponent’s lexicographic belief on her, and so on. This belief hierarchy
is described by a lexicographic epistemic model with types.
Definition 2.1 (Epistemic model with complete information). Consider a finite 2-
person static game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I . A finite lexicographic epistemic model for Γ is a
tupleMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I where
(a) Ti is a finite set of types, and
(b) bi is a mapping that assigns to each ti ∈ Ti a lexicographic belief over ∆(C j×Tj),
i.e., bi(ti) = (bi1,bi2, ...,biK) where bik ∈ ∆(C j×Tj) for k = 1, ...,K.
Consider ti ∈ Ti with bi(ti) = (bi1,bi2, ...,biK). Each bik (k = 1, ...,K) is called
ti’s level-k belief. For each (c j, t j) ∈ C j × Tj, we say ti deems (c j, t j) possible iff
bik(c j, t j) > 0 for some k ∈ {1, ...,K}. We say ti deems t j ∈ Tj possible iff ti deems
(c j, t j) possible for some c j ∈C j. For each ti ∈ Ti, we denote by Tj(ti) the set of types
in Tj deemed possible by ti.
A type ti ∈ Ti is cautious iff for each c j ∈C j and each t j ∈ Tj(ti), ti deems (c j, t j)
possible. That is, ti takes into account each choice of player j for every belief hierar-
chy of j deemed possible by ti.
For each ci ∈ Ci, let ui(ci, ti) = (ui(ci,bi1)., ..,ui(ci,biK)) where for each k =
1, ...,K, ui(ci,bik) := Σ(c j ,t j)∈C j×Tjbik(c j, t j)ui(ci,c j), that is, each ui(ci,bik) is the ex-
pected utility for ci over bik and ui(ci, ti) is a vector of expected utilities. For each
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ci,c
′
i ∈ Ci, we say that ti prefers ci to c
′
i, denoted by ui(ci, ti) > ui(c
′
i, ti), iff there is
k ∈ {0, ...,K− 1} such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) ui(ci,biℓ) = ui(c
′
i,biℓ) for ℓ= 0, ...,k, and
(b) ui(ci,bi,k+1)> ui(c
′
i,bi,k+1).
We say that ti is indifferent between ci and c
′
i, denoted by ui(ci, ti) = ui(c
′
i, ti), iff
ui(ci,bik) = ui(c
′
i,bik) for each k= 1, ...,K. It can be seen that this preference relation
on Ci under each type ti is a linear order. ci is rational (or optimal) for ti iff ti does
not prefer any choice to ci. A type ti ∈ Ti primarily believes in the opponent’s ratio-
nality iff ti’s level-1 belief only assigns positive probability to those (c j, t j) where c j
is rational for t j. That is, at least in the primary belief ti is convinced that j behaves
rationally given her belief.
For (c j, t j),(c
′
j, t
′
j) ∈ C j × Tj, we say that ti deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely
than (c′j, t
′
j) iff there is k ∈ {0, ...,K− 1} such that the following two conditions are
satisfied:
(a) biℓ(c j, t j) = biℓ(c
′
j, t
′
j) = 0 for ℓ= 0, ...,k, and
(b) bi,k+1(c j, t j)> 0 and bi,k+1(c
′
j, t
′
j) = 0.
A cautious type ti ∈ Ti respects the opponent’s preferences iff for each t j ∈ Tj(ti)
and c j,c
′
j ∈ C j where t j prefers c j to c
′
j, ti deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely than
(c′j, t j). That is, ti arranges j’s choices from the most to the least preferred for each
belief hierarchy of j deemed possible by ti. It can be seen that respect of the oppo-
nent’s preferences implies primary belief in the opponent’s rationality. Indeed, the
former requires that each type of the opponent deemed possible in the primary belief
should only pair with choices most preferred under that type.
Let P be an arbitrary property of lexicographic beliefs. We define that
(a) ti ∈ Ti expresses 0-fold full belief in P iff ti satisfies P;
(b) For each n ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in P iff ti only deems
possible j’s types that express n-fold full belief in P.
A type ti expresses common full belief in P iff it expresses n-fold full belief in P
for each n ∈ N.
Definition 2.2 (Permissibility and proper rationalizability). Consider a finite lex-
icographic epistemic model Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for a game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I . ci ∈ Ci is
permissible iff it is rational for some ti ∈ Ti which expresses common full belief in
caution and primary belief in rationality. ci is properly rationalizable iff it is ratio-
nal for some ti ∈ Ti which expresses common full belief in caution and respect of
preferences.
Since respect of the opponent’s preferences implies primary belief in the oppo-
nent’s rationality, proper rationalizability implies permissibility, while the reverse
does not hold.
A cautious type ti ∈ Ti assumes the j’s rationality iff the following two conditions
are satisfied:
(a) for all of player j’s choices c j that are optimal for some cautious belief, ti deems
possible some cautious type t j for which c j is optimal;
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(b) ti deems all choice-type pairs (c j, t j) where t j is cautious and c j is optimal for
t j infinitely more likely than any choice-type pairs (c
′
j, t
′
j) that does not have this
property.
Informally speaking, assumption of the opponent’s rationality is that ti puts all
“good” choices in front of those “bad” choices.
On the other hand, extending assumption of rationality into n-fold for any n ∈ N
is more complicated than n-fold full belief. Formally, consider a finite lexicographic
epistemic model Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for a game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I . A cautious type ti ∈ Ti
expresses 1-fold assumption of rationality iff it assumes j’s rationality. For any n∈N,
we say that a cautious type ti ∈ Ti expresses (n+1)-fold assumption of rationality iff
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) whenever a choice c j of player j is optimal for some cautious type (not necessarily
in Mco) that expresses up to n-fold assumption of rationality, ti deems possible some
cautious type t j for player j which expresses up to n-fold assumption of rationality
for which c j is optimal;
(b) ti deems all choice-type pair (c j, t j) where t j is cautious and expresses up to n-
fold assumption of rationality and c j is optimal for t j infinitely more likely than any
choice-type pair (c′j, t
′
j) that does not satisfy this property.
We say that ti expresses common assumption of rationality iff it expresses n-fold
assumption of rationality for every n ∈ N.
Definition 2.3 (Iterated admissibility). Consider a finite lexicographic epistemic
modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for a game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I . ci is iteratively admissible iff it is
rational for some ti ∈ Ti which expresses common assumption of rationality.
3 Epistemic Model with Incomplete Information
In this section, we define the lexicographic epistemic model with incomplete infor-
mation which is the counterpart of the probabilistic epistemic model with incomplete
information introduced by Battigalli (2003) and extensively developed in Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003), (2007), and Dekel and Siniscalchi (2015). We also define
conditions on types in such a model.
Definition 3.1 (Lexicographic epistemic model with incomplete information).
Consider a finite 2-person static game form G = (Ci)i∈I . For each i ∈ I, let Vi be
the set of utility functions vi : C1×C2 → R. A finite lexicographic epistemic model
for G with incomplete information is a tupleMin = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I where
(a) Θi is a finite set of types,
(b) wi is a mapping that assigns to each θi ∈Θi a utility function wi(θi) ∈Vi, and
(c) βi is a mapping that assigns to each θi ∈Θi a lexicographic belief over ∆(C j×Θ j),
i.e., βi(θi) = (βi1,βi2, ...,βiK) where βik ∈ ∆(C j×Θ j) for k = 1, ...,K.
Concepts such as “θi deems (c j,θ j) possible” and “θi deems (c j,θ j) infinitely
more likely than (c′j,θ
′
j)” can be defined in a similar way as in Section 2. For each
θi ∈ Θi, we use Θ j(θi) to denote the set of types in Θ j deemed possible by θi. For
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each θi ∈Θi and vi ∈Vi, θ
vi
i is the auxiliary type satisfying that βi(θ
vi
i ) = βi(θi) and
wi(θ
vi
i ) = vi.
For each ci ∈Ci,vi ∈Vi, and θi ∈Θi with βi(θi) = (βi1,βi2, ...,βiK), let vi(ci,θi) =
(vi(ci,βi1), ...,vi(ci,βiK))where vi(ci,βik) :=Σ(c j ,θ j)∈C j×Θ jβik(c j,θ j)vi(ci,c j) for each
k= 1, ...,K, For each ci,c
′
i ∈Ci and θi ∈Θi,we say that θi prefers ci to c
′
i iffwi(θi)(ci,θi)
> wi(θi)(c
′
i,θi). As in Section 2, this is also the lexicographic comparison between
two vectors. ci is rational (or optimal) for θi iff θi does not prefer any choice to ci.
In the following we define two groups of conditions on types in an epistemic
model with incomplete information, which correspond to the two groups of charac-
terizations in Section 4.
3.1 The first group of conditions
Definition 3.2 (Caution). A type θi ∈Θi is cautious iff for each c j ∈C j and each θ j ∈
Θ j(θi), there is some utility function v j ∈V j such that θi deems (c j,θ
v j
j ) possible.
This is a faithful translation of Perea and Roy (2017)’s definition of caution in a
probabilistic model into a lexicographic one. It is the counterpart of caution defined
within the complete information framework in Section 2; the only difference is that
in incomplete information models we allow different utility functions since c j will be
required to be rational for the paired type.
For each ui,vi ∈ Vi, we define the distance d(ui,vi) between ui,vi by d(ui,vi) =
[Σs∈S(ui(s)− vi(s))
2]1/2. This is the Euclidean distance on RC. We choose it is just
out of simplicity. Any distance satisfying the three conditions in Section 3.3 of Perea
and Roy (2017) also works in our characterization.
A problem here is that utility functions are numerical representations of prefer-
ences, yet the Euclidean distance measures cardinal similarity between utility func-
tions rather than the similarity between preferences they represent. For example,
though multiplying ui with a positive number leads to the same preferences repre-
sented by ui, its Euclidean distance from ui may be large. In Section 5.4 we will
define an ordinal distance on Vi and show that the characterizations still hold under
that distance.
Definition 3.3 (Primary belief in utilities nearest to u and u-centered belief).
Consider a static game form G = (Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model M
in =
(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information, and a pair u = (ui)i∈I of utility
functions.
(3.1) A type θi ∈ Θi primarily believes in utilities nearest to u iff θi’s level-1 be-
lief only assigns positive probability to (c j,θ j) which satisfies that d(w j(θ j),u j) ≤
d(w j(θ
′
j),u j) for all θ
′
j ∈Θ j(θi) with β j(θ
′
j) = β j(θ j).
(3.2)A type θi ∈Θi has u-centered belief iff for any c j,c
′
j ∈C j, any θ j ∈Θ j, and any
v j,v
′
j ∈V j such that (c j,θ
v j
j ) and (c
′
j,θ
v′j
j ) are deemed possible by θi, it holds that θi
deems (c j,θ
v j
j ) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j,θ
v′j
j ) whenever d(v j,u j)< d(v
′
j,u j).
Definition 3.3 gives restrictions on the order of types in a lexicographic belief.
(3.1) requires that θi primarily believes in type θ j only if θ j’s utility function is the
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Table 5 No nearest utility function in lexicographic beliefs
u1 D E F
A 1 1 1
B 1 1 0
C 1 0 1
nearest one to u j among all types deemed possible by θi which share the same belief
with θ j . (3.2) requires that the types of j sharing the same belief deemed possible
by θi are arranged according to the distance of their assigned utility functions from
u j : the farther a type θ j’s utility function is from u j, the later θ j occurs in the lexico-
graphic belief of θi. (3.2) is a faithful translation of Perea and Roy (2017)’s Definition
3.2 into lexicographic model and (3.1) is weaker than (3.2).
The essential difference between our conditions and Perea and Roy (2017)’s lies
in the following definition.
Definition 3.4 (A best (better) choice is supported by utilities nearest (nearer)
to u). Consider a static game form G = (Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model
Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information, and a pair u = (ui)i∈I of
utility functions.
(4.1)A type θi ∈Θi believes in that a best choice of j is supported by utilities nearest
to u iff for any (c j,θ j), (c
′
j,θ
′
j) deemed possible by θi with β j(θ j) = β j(θ
′
j), if c j is
optimal for β j(θ j) in u j but c
′
j is not, then d(w j(θ j),u j)< d(w j(θ
′
j),u j).
(4.2) A type θi ∈ Θi believes in that a better choice of j is supported by utilities
nearer to u iff for any (c j,θ j), (c
′
j,θ
′
j) deemed possible by θi with β j(θ j) = β j(θ
′
j),
if u j(c j,θ j)> u j(c
′
j,θ
′
j), then d(w j(θ j),u j)< d(w j(θ
′
j),u j).
Definition 3.4 gives restriction on the relation between paired choices and types.
(4.1) requires that for each belief of player j, a choice optimal for that belief should
be supported by the nearest utility function to u j. (4.2) requires that for each belief of
player j, a utility function supporting a “better” choice (i.e., c j) should be nearer to
u j than one supporting a “worse” choice (i.e., c
′
j). It can be seen that (4.2) is stronger
than (4.1).
(4.2) is similar to Perea and Roy (2017)’s Definition 3.3 which requires that for
each (c j,θ j) deemed possible by θi, w j(θ j) is the nearest utility function in V j to
u j among those in which c j is rational under β j(θ j). It can be shown by Lemmas
5.4 and 5.5 in Perea and Roy (2017) that Definition 3.4 (4.2) is weaker than Perea
and Roy [21]’s Definition 3.3. We adopt it here since a nearest utility function does
not in general exist for lexicographic beliefs. That is, given u j ∈ V j, c j ∈ C j, and a
lexicographic belief β j, there may not exist v j ∈ V j satisfying that (1) c j is rational
at v j under β j, and (2) there is no v
′
j ∈ V j such that c j is rational at v
′
j for β j and
d(v′j,u j)< d(v j,u j). See the following example.
Example 3.1 (No nearest utility function). Consider a game Γ where player 1 has
choices A,B, and C and player 2 has choices D,E, and F. The payoff function u1 of
player 1 is shown in Table 5. Let β1 = (D,E,F), that is, player 1 deems player 2’s
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Table 6 A worse choice is supported by a better utility function
u1 D E F
A 1 1 1
B 1+ d
2
1 0
C 1 0 1
choice D infinitely more likely than E and E infinitely more likely than F . In u1, A is
rational for β1 but B is not.
Now we show that there is no nearest utility function to u1 at which B is rational
under β1. Suppose there is such a function v1 ∈ V1. Let d = d(v1,u1). It can be seen
that d > 0. Consider v′1 in Table 6. B is also rational at v
′
1 under β1, while d(v
′
1,u1) =
d
2
< d = d(v1,u1), a contradiction. Also, though β1 prefers B toC in u1, it can be seen
that for each utility function vB1 in which B is rational under β1, there is some v
C
1 ∈V1
satisfying (1)C is optimal in vC1 under β1, and (2) d(v
C
1 ,u1)< d(v
B
1 ,u1). Indeed, this
can be done by letting vC1 (C,D) = 1+ d(v
B
1 ,u1)/2 and v
C
1 (c1,c2) = u1(c1,c2) for all
other (c1,c2) ∈C1×C2.
Example 3.1 shows that the relationship between preferences among choices and
the distance of utility functions from the original one is more complicated for lexico-
graphic beliefs. That is why we adopt Definition 3.4 (4.2) here. The following lemma
guarantees the existence of utility functions satisfying the condition in Definition 3.4
(4.2). It shows that, given a utility function ui and a lexicographic belief βi, corre-
sponding to the sequence ci1, ...,ciN of i’s choices arranged from the most to the least
preferred at ui under βi, there is a sequence vi1, ...,viN of utility functions arranged
from the nearest to the farthest to ui such that for each n = 1, ...,N, cin is rational at
vin under βi. This lemma plays a similar role in our characterizations as Lemmas 5.4
and 5.5 in Perea and Roy [21].
Lemma 3.1 (Existence of utilities satisfying Definition 3.4 (4.2)). Consider a static
game form G = (Ci)i∈I , ui ∈ Vi, and βi = (βi1,βi2, ...,βiK) such that βik ∈ ∆(C j) for
each k= 1, ...,K. Let Πi(βi) = (Ci1,Ci2, ...,CiL) be a partition ofCi satisfying that (1)
for each ℓ = 1, ...,L and each ciℓ,c
′
iℓ ∈ Ciℓ, ui(ciℓ,βi) = ui(c
′
iℓ,βi), and (2) for each
ℓ = 1, ...,L− 1, each ciℓ ∈ Ciℓ and ci,ℓ+1 ∈ Ci,ℓ+1, ui(ciℓ,βi) > ui(ci,ℓ+1,βi). That is,
Πi(βi) is the sequence of equivalence classes of choices inCi arranged from the most
preferred to the least preferred under βi.
Then there are vi1, ...,viL ∈Vi satisfying
(a) vi1 = ui,
(b) For each ℓ= 1, ...,L and each ciℓ ∈Ciℓ, ciℓ is rational at viℓ under βi, and
(c) For each ℓ= 1, ...,L− 1, d(viℓ,ui)< d(vi,ℓ+1,ui).
3.2 The second group of conditions
Definition 3.5 (Belief in rationality). θi ∈Θi believes in j’s rationality iff θi deems
(c j,θ j) possible only if c j is rational for θ j.
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In an incomplete information model, since each type is assigned with a belief on
the opponent’s choice-type pairs as well as a payoff function, caution and a full belief
of rationality can be satisfied simultaneously. The consistency of caution and ratio-
nality is the essential difference of models with incomplete information from those
with complete information. Rationality does not appear in the first group of charac-
terizations, but in the proofs we will construct incomplete information models whose
types satisfies all the conditions as well as common full belief in rationality. On the
other hand, rationality plays an important role in the characterization of the second
group. We will discuss more about this consistency between caution and rationality
in Sections 5.3.
Definition 3.6 (Primary belief in u and prior assumption of u). Consider a static
game form G = (Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model M
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G
with incomplete information, and a pair u= (ui)i∈I of utility functions.
(6.1) θi ∈Θi primarily believes in u iff θi’s level-1 belief only assigns positive prob-
ability to (c j,θ j) with w j(θ j) = u j.
(6.2) θi ∈Θi prior assumes u iff for any (c j,θ j) with θ j cautious deemed possible by
θi satisfying that w j(θ j) = u j, then θi deems (c j,θ j) infinitely more likely than any
pair does not satisfy that property.
Primary belief in u is stronger than Definition 3.3 (3.1). (3.1) allows the occur-
rence of a type with a utility function which is very similar (but not necessarily equal)
to u j in the level-1 belief of θi, while primary belief in u only allows types with utility
function u j there. (6.2) is stronger than (6.1) since (6.2) requires that all choice-type
pairs which believes in u should be put in front of pairs which do not believe in u,
while (6.1) only requires that level-1 belief believes in u.
Definition 3.7 (Every good choice is supported). Consider a static game form G=
(Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model M
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G with incomplete
information, and a pair u = (ui)i∈I of utility functions. A cautious type θi ∈ Θi as-
sumes that every good choice of j is supported iff for each c j that is optimal for
some cautious type of j (may not be in Min) with u j as its assigned utility function,
θi deems possible a cautious type θ j ∈Θ j such that w j(θ j) = u j and c j is optimal for
θ j.
Common assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported is, as
common assumption of rationality in incomplete information model, more compli-
cated from common full belief. We have the following definition.
Definition 3.8 (n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is sup-
ported) Consider a static game form G = (Ci)i∈I, a lexicographic epistemic model
Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information, and a pair u= (ui)i∈I of util-
ity functions. θi ∈ Θi expresses 1-fold assumption of prior u and that every good
choice is supported iff it prior assumes u and assumes that every good choice of j is
supported. For any n ∈ N, we say that a cautious type θi ∈Θi expresses (n+ 1)-fold
assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported iff the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(a) whenever a choice c j of player j is optimal for some cautious type (not necessarily
inMin) with u j as its assigned utility function that expresses up to n-fold assumption
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of that every good choice is supported, θi deems possible some cautious type θ j with
w j(θ j) = u j for player j which expresses up to n-fold assumption of prior u and that
every good choice is supported for which c j is optimal.
(b) θi deems all choice-type pairs (c j,θ j), where θ j is cautious and expresses up to
n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported and satisfies
w j(θ j) = u j, infinitely more likely than any choice-type pair (c
′
j,θ
′
j) that does not
satisfy this property.
We say that ti expresses common assumption of prior u and in that every good
choice is supported iff it expresses n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good
choice is supported for every n ∈ N.
4 Characterizations
So far we have introduced conditions under two different frameworks for static games:
one includes permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility within
a complete information framework, the other contains various conditions on types
within an incomplete information framework. In this section we will show that there
are correspondences between them. The characterizations will be separated into two
groups: in the first group we characterize permissibility and proper rationalizabil-
ity, and in the second group we characterize permissibility in an alternative way and
iterated admissibility. The critical difference between the two groups is the role of
rationality.
4.1 Without rationality: permissibility and proper rationalizability
In this subsection we give characterizations of permissibility and proper rationaliz-
ability. An illustrative example will also be provided.
Theorem 4.1 (Characterization of permissibility). Consider a finite 2-person static
game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I and the corresponding game form G= (Ci)i∈I .
Then, c∗i ∈ Ci is permissible if and only if there is some finite lexicographic
epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I with incomplete information for G and some
θ ∗i ∈Θi with wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui such that
(a) c∗i is rational for θ
∗
i , and,
(b) θ ∗i expresses common full belief in caution, primary belief in utilities nearest to
u, and that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest to u.
Theorem 4.2 (Characterization of proper rationalizability). Consider a finite 2-
person static game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I and the corresponding game form G= (Ci)i∈I .
Then, c∗i ∈Ci is properly rationalizable if and only if there is some finite lexico-
graphic epistemic modelMin = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G and some θ
∗
i ∈Θi with wi(θ
∗
i ) =
ui such that
(a) c∗i is rational for θ
∗
i , and
(b) θ ∗i expresses common full belief in caution, u-centered belief, and that a better
choice is supported by utilities nearer to u.
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Table 7 The game for Example 4.1
u1\u2 D E F
A 0,3 1,2 1,1
B 1,3 0,2 1,1
C 1,3 1,2 0,1
Table 8 Alternative utility functions for players 1 and 2
v1 D E F
A 0 1 1
B 2 0 1
C 1 1 0
v′1 D E F
A 3 1 1
B 2 0 1
C 1 1 0
v2 D E F
A 3 2 1
B 3 2 1
C 3 4 1
v′2 D E F
A 3 2 1
B 3 2 1
C 3 4 5
To show these statements, we will construct a correspondence between complete
information models and incomplete ones and show that conditions on a type in one
model can be transformed into proper conditions on the corresponding type in the
constructed model. We use the following example to show the intuition.
Example 4.1. Consider the game Γ in Table 7(Perea, 2012, p.190) and the lexico-
graphic modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for Γ where T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, and
b1(t1) = ((D, t2),(E, t2),(F, t2)), b2(t2) = ((C, t1),(B, t1),(A, t1)).
It can be seen that D is properly rationalizable (and therefore permissible) since
it is rational for t2 which expresses common full belief in caution and respect of
preferences. Consider the lexicographic epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I with
incomplete information for the corresponding game form whereΘ1 = {θ11,θ12,θ13},
Θ2 = {θ21,θ22,θ23}, and
w1(θ11) = u1, β1(θ11) = ((D,θ21),(E,θ22),(F,θ23)),
w1(θ12) = v1, β1(θ12) = ((D,θ21),(E,θ22),(F,θ23)),
w1(θ13) = v
′
1, β1(θ13) = ((D,θ21),(E,θ22),(F,θ23)),
w2(θ21) = u2, β2(θ21) = ((C,θ11),(B,θ12)),(A,θ13)),
w2(θ22) = v2, β2(θ22) = ((C,θ11),(B,θ12)),(A,θ13)),
w2(θ23) = v
′
2, β2(θ23) = ((C,θ11),(B,θ12)),(A,θ13)).
where the alternative utility functions are shown in Table 8. For each i ∈ I, θi1, θi2,
and θi3 have the same belief; the only difference lies in their assigned utility functions
since each should support some choice. The relation between Min and Mco can be
seen clearly: for each i ∈ I, θi1, θi2, and θi3 correspond to ti in the sense that the
belief of the former is obtained by replacing every occurrence of t j in the belief of ti
by the type corresponding to t j inM
in at which the paired choice is optimal. It can be
seen that θ11 expresses common full belief in caution, u-centered belief, and that a
better choice is supported by utilities nearer to u (therefore primary belief in utilities
nearest to u and that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest to u). Also, since
the assigned utility function of θ11 is u1,C is rational for θ11.
Characterization by Incomplete Information 15
4.2 With rationality: permissibility and iterated admissibility
In this subsection we give an alternative characterization of permissibility and a char-
acterization of iterated admissibility. Since the correspondence between models with
complete information and incomplete information are basically the same with the
previous group, here the results are given without examples.
Theorem 4.3 (An alternative characterization of permissibility). Consider a finite
2-person static game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I and the corresponding game form G= (Ci)i∈I .
Then, c∗i ∈ Ci is permissible in M
co if and only if there is some finite lexico-
graphic epistemic modelMin = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I with incomplete information for G and
some θ ∗i ∈Θi with wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui such that
(a) c∗i is rational for θ
∗
i , and,
(b) θ ∗i expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, and primary belief in u.
Theorem 4.4 (Characterization of iterated admissibility). Consider a finite 2-
person static game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I and the corresponding game form G= (Ci).
Then c∗i ∈Ci is iteratively admissible if and only if there is some finite epistemic
modelMin = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I with incomplete information forG and some θ
∗
i ∈Θi with
wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui such that
(a) c∗i is rational for θ
∗
i , and
(b) θ ∗i expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, and common assumption
of prior u and that every good choice is supported.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
To show the only-if part of Theorem 4.1 (and that of all other theorems), we construct
the following mapping from finite lexicographic epistemic models with complete in-
formation to those with incomplete information. Consider Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I and a finite
lexicographic epistemic modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I with complete information forΓ .We
first define types in a model with incomplete information in the following two steps:
Step 1. For each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti, let Πi(ti) = (Ci1, ...,CiL) be the sequence of equiv-
alence classes of choices in Ci arranged from the most preferred to the least pre-
ferred under ti. By Lemma 3.1, for each Ciℓ there is some viℓ(ti) ∈ Vi such that each
choice inCiℓ is rational at viℓ(ti) under ti, and 0= d(vi1(ti),ui)< d(vi2(ti),ui)< ... <
d(viL(ti),ui).
Step 2. We define Θi(ti) = {θi1(ti), ...,θiL(ti)} where for each ℓ = 1, ...,L, the type
θiℓ(ti) satisfies that (1) wi(θiℓ(ti)) = viℓ(ti), and (2) βi(θiℓ(ti)) is obtained from bi(ti)
by replacing every (c j, t j) with c j ∈ C jr ∈ Π j(t j) for some r with (c j,θ j) where
θ j = θ jr(t j), that is, w j(θ j) is the utility function among those corresponding to
Π j(t j) in which c j is the rational for ti.
For each i ∈ I, let Θi = ∪ti∈TiΘi(ti). Here we have constructed a finite lexico-
graphic epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for the corresponding game form G =
(Ci)i∈I with incomplete information. It should be noted thatM
in is not uniquely deter-
mined since there are multiple sequences of utility functions satisfying the conditions
in Lemma 3.1.
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Table 9 The game for Example 4.2
u1\u2 C D
A 1,0 0,1
B 0,0 0,1
Table 10 Utility functions of player 1 corresponding to t1 and t2
v12(t1) C D
A 1 0
B 0 1
v22(t2) C D
A 2 1
B 0 1
We show how this construction works by the following example.
Example 4.2. Consider the game Γ in Table 9 (Perea, 2012, p.188) and the lexico-
graphic epistemic modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I of Γ where T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, and
b1(t1) = ((D, t2),(C, t2)), b2(t2) = ((A, t1),(B, t1)).
We show how to construct a corresponding model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I . First, by
Step 1 it can be seen that Π1(t1) = ({A},{B}) and Π2(t2) = ({D},{C}). We let
v11(t1) = u1 where A is rational for t1 and v12(t1) where B is rational for t1 as follows.
Similarly, we let v21(t2) = u2 where D is rational under t2 and v22(t2) where C is
rational under t2 as follows:
Then we go to Step 2. It can be seen that Θ1(t1) = {θ11(t1),θ12(t1)}, where
w1(θ11(t1)) = v11(t1), β1(θ11(t1)) = ((D,θ21(t2)),(C,θ22(t2))),
w1(θ12(t1)) = v12(t1), β1(θ12(t1)) = ((D,θ21(t2)),(C,θ22(t2))).
Also, Θ2(t2) = {θ21(t2),θ22(t2)}, where
w2(θ21(t2)) = v21(t2), β2(θ21(t2)) = ((A,θ11(t1)),(B,θ12(t1))),
w2(θ22(t2)) = v22(t2), β2(θ22(t2)) = ((A,θ11(t1)),(B,θ12(t1))).
Consider Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I and M
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I corresponding to M
co con-
structed by the two steps above. We have the following observations.
Observation 4.1 (Redundancy). For each ti ∈ Ti and each θi,θ
′
i ∈ Θi(ti), βi(θi) =
βi(θ
′
i ).
Observation 4.2 (Rationality). Each θi ∈Θi(ti) believes in j’s rationality.
Observation 4.3 (A better choice is supported by utilities nearer to u). Each
θi ∈Θi(ti) believes that a better choice is supported by utilities nearer to u.
The observations are true by construction. Observation 4.1 means that the differ-
ence between any two types in a Θi(ti) is in the utility functions assigned to them.
Observation 4.2 means that in an incomplete information model constructed from
one with complete information, each type believes in the opponent’s rationality. This
is because in the construction, we requires that for each pair (c j, t j) occurring in
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a belief, its counterpart in the incomplete information replaces t j by type in Θ j(t j)
with the utility function in which c j is optimal for t j. It follows from Observation
4.2 that each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses common full belief in rationality. Observation 4.3
implies that the best choice is supported by utilities nearest to u. It follows that each
θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses common full belief in that a best (better) choice is supported by
utilities nearest (nearer) to u.
By construction, each ti shares the same belief about j’s choices at each level with
each θi ∈Θi(ti); also, for each ti ∈ Ti, the utility function assigned to θi1(ti) is ui. It is
clear that any ci rational for ti is also rational for θi1(ti). Therefore, to show the only-if
part of Theorem 4.1, we show that if ti expresses common full belief in caution and
primary belief in rationality, then θi1(ti) expresses common belief in caution, primary
belief in utilities nearest to u, and that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest
to u.
Lemma 4.1 (Cautionco→Cautionin). ConsiderMco =(Ti,bi)i∈I andM
in =(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I
corresponding toMco. If ti ∈ Ti expresses common full belief in caution, so does each
θi ∈Θi(ti).
Lemma 4.2 (Primary belief in rationality→ primary belief in utilities nearest to
u). ConsiderMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I andM
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I corresponding toM
co. If ti ∈ Ti
expresses common full belief in primary belief in rationality, then each θi ∈Θi(ti) ex-
presses common full belief in primary belief in utilities nearest to u.
Proof of the only-if part of Theorem 4.1. ConsiderMco =(Ti,bi)i∈I ,M
in =(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I
corresponding to Mco, a permissible choice c∗i ∈ Ci, and t
∗
i ∈ Ti which is a type ex-
pressing common full belief in caution and primary belief in rationality such that c∗i
is rational for t∗i . Let θ
∗
i = θi1(t
∗
i ). By definition,wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui and βi(θ
∗
i ) has the same
distribution on j’s choices at each level as bi(t
∗
i ). Hence c
∗
i is rational for θ
∗
i . Also,
it follows from Observation 4.3 and Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 that θ ∗i expresses common
full belief in caution, primary belief in utilities nearest to u, and that a best choice is
supported by utilities nearest to u. 
To show the if part, we need a mapping from models with incomplete infor-
mation to those with complete information. Consider a finite 2-person static game
Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I , the corresponding game form G = (Ci)i∈I , and a finite epistemic
modelMin = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information. We construct a model
Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for Γ with complete information as follows. For each θi ∈ Θi, we
define Ei(θi) = {θ
′
i ∈Θi : βi(θ
′
i ) = β (θi)}. In this way Θi is partitioned into several
equivalence classes Ei = {Ei1, ...,EiL} where for each ℓ = 1, ..,L, Eiℓ = Ei(θi) for
some θi ∈Θi. To each Ei ∈ Ei we use ti(Ei) to denote a type. We define bi(ti(Ei)) to
be a lexicographic belief which is obtained from βi(θi) by replacing each occurrence
of (c j,θ j) by (c j, t j(E j(θ j))); in other words, bi(ti(Ei)) has the same distribution on
choices at each level as βi(θi) for each θi ∈ Ei, while each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) is replaced
by t j(E j(θ j)). For each i ∈ I, let Ti = {ti(Ei)}Ei∈Ei . We have constructed fromM
in a
finite epistemic modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I with complete information for Γ .
We show how this construction works by the following example.
Example 4.3. Consider the gameΓ in Example 4.2 and the modelMin =(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I
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for the corresponding game form whereΘ1 = {θ11,θ12}, Θ2 = {θ21,θ22}, and
w1(θ11) = u1, β1(θ11) = ((D,θ21),(C,θ22)),
w1(θ12) = v1, β1(θ12) = ((D,θ21),(C,θ22)),
w2(θ21) = u2, β2(θ21) = ((A,θ11),(B,θ12)),
w2(θ22) = v2, β2(θ22) = ((A,θ11),(B,θ12)).
where v1= v12(t1) and v2= v22(t2) in Example 4.2. It can be seen thatE1 = {{θ11,θ12}}
since β1(θ11) = β1(θ12) andE2 = {{θ21,θ22}} since β2(θ21) = β2(θ22). Correspond-
ing to those equivalence classes we have t1({θ11,θ12}) and t2({θ21,θ22}), and
b1(t1({θ11,θ12})) = ((D, t2({θ21,θ22})),(C, t2({θ21,θ22}))),
b2(t2({θ21,θ22})) = ((A, t1({θ11,θ12})),(B, t1({θ11,θ12}))).
It can be seen that this is the reversion of the previous construction if each type has
distinct belief on choices of the opposite. Indeed, let Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I satisfying that
bi(ti) 6= bi(t
′
i ) for each ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti with ti 6= t
′
i , and M
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I be constructed
from Mco by the previous two steps. Then Ei = {Θi(ti)}ti∈Ti and ti(Θi(ti)) = ti for
each i ∈ I.
To show the if part of Theorem 4.1, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3 (Cautionin → Cautionco). Consider Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I and M
co =
(Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding to M
in constructed by the above approach. If θi ∈ Θi ex-
presses common full belief in caution, so does ti(Ei(θi)).
Lemma 4.4 (Cautionin + primary belief in utilities nearest to u + a best choice
is supported by utilities nearest to u→ Primary belief in rationality). Consider
Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I and M
co = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding to M
in. If θi ∈Θi expresses
common full belief in caution, primary belief in utilities nearest to u, and that a best
choice is supported by utilities nearest to u, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses common full
belief in primary belief in rationality.
Proof of the if part of Theorem 4.1. ConsiderMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding toM
in
and c∗i ∈Ci rational for some θ
∗
i withwi(θ
∗
i ) = ui which expresses common full belief
in caution, primary belief in utilities nearest to u, and that a best choice is supported
by utilities nearest to u. Consider ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). Since wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui and bi(ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )))
has the same distribution on j’s choices at each level as βi(θ
∗
i ), c
∗
i is rational for
ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). Also, by Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4, ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )) expresses common full belief in
caution and primary belief in rationality. Hence c∗i is permissible in Γ . 
4.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
To show the only-if part of Theorem 4.2, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.5 (Respect of preferences→ u-centered belief). ConsiderMco =(Ti,bi)i∈I
and Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I corresponding to M
co constructed by the two steps in Sec-
tion 4.3. If ti ∈ Ti expresses common full belief in caution and respect of preferences,
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then each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses full belief in u-centered belief.
Proof of the only-if part of Theorem 4.2. ConsiderMco =(Ti,bi)i∈I ,M
in =(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I
corresponding to Mco, a properly rationalizable c∗i ∈Ci, and t
∗
i ∈ Ti expressing com-
mon full belief in caution and respect of preferences such that c∗i is rational for t
∗
i . Let
θ ∗i = θi1(t
∗
i ). Since wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui and βi(θ
∗
i ) has the same distribution on j’s choices
as bi(t
∗
i ), c
∗
i is rational for θ
∗
i . Also, it follows from Observations 4.3 and Lemmas
4.1 and 4.5 that θ ∗i expresses common belief in caution, u-centered belief, and that a
better choice is supported by utilities nearer to u. 
To show the if part, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6 (Cautionin + u-centered belief + a better choice is supported by
utilities nearer to u→ respect of preferences). Consider Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I and
Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding to M
in constructed by the approach in Section 4.3. If
θi ∈ Θi expresses common full belief in caution, u-centered belief, and that a better
choice is supported by utilities nearer to u, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses common full be-
lief in respect of preferences.
Proof of the if part of Theorem 4.2. ConsiderMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding toM
in
and c∗i ∈Ci be rational for some θ
∗
i with wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui which expresses common belief
in caution, rationality, u-centered belief, and that a better choice is supported by util-
ities nearer to u. Consider ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). Since wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui and ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )) and θ
∗
i have
the same distribution on j’s choices in each level, c∗i is rational for ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). Also,
it follows from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6 that ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )) expresses common full belief in
caution and respect of preferences. Hence c∗i is properly rationalizable in Γ . 
4.5 Proof of Theorem 4.3
The only-if part of Theorem 4.3 follows directly from Observation 4.2, Lemma 4.1,
and the following lemma whose proof can be found in Section 6.
Lemma 4.7 (Primary belief in rationality→ Primary belief in u). ConsiderMco =
(Ti,bi)i∈I andM
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I corresponding toM
co. If ti ∈ Ti expresses common
full belief in primary belief in rationality, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) expresses common
full belief in primary belief in u.
To show the if part, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8 (Rationality + primary belief in u→ Primary belief in rationality).
Consider Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I and M
co = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding to M
in. If θi ∈ Θi
expresses common full belief in rationality and primary belief in u, then ti(Ei(θi))
expresses common full belief in primary belief in rationality.
Proof of the if part of Theorem 4.3. ConsiderMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding toM
in
and c∗i ∈Ci rational for some θ
∗
i withwi(θ
∗
i ) = ui which expresses common full belief
in caution, rationality, and primary belief in u. Consider ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). Since wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui
and bi(ti(Ei(θ
∗
i ))) has the same distribution on j’s choices at each level as βi(θ
∗
i ), c
∗
i
is rational for ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). By Lemmas 4.3 and 4.8, ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )) expresses common full
belief in caution and primary belief in rationality. Hence c∗i is permissible in Γ . 
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4.6 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Lemma 4.9 (Assumption of rationality→ every good choice is supported + prior
assumption of u, every good choice is supported + prior assumption of u +
rationality → assumption of rationality). Consider Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I and M
in =
(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I corresponding toM
co. If ti ∈ Ti expresses common assumption of ratio-
nality, then each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses common assumption of prior u and that every
good choice is supported.
On the other hand, considerMin =(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I andM
co =(Ti,bi)i∈I correspond-
ing to Min. If θi ∈ Θi expresses common full belief in rationality and common as-
sumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses
common assumption of rationality.
Here we have to combine the two ways (i.e., complete information models to
incomplete information ones and the other way around) into one lemma. The reason is
that to prove Lemma 4.9, we cannot separate them as we did in the previous lemmas;
we need to show two ways in the induction base as well as in the induction step. The
details are left to Section 6.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. (Only-if) Consider Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I , M
in = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I
corresponding toMco, an iteratively admissible choice c∗i ∈Ci, and t
∗
i ∈ Ti expressing
common full belief in caution and common assumption of rationality such that c∗i is
rational for t∗i . Let θ
∗
i = θi1(t
∗
i ). By definition, wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui and βi(θ
∗
i ) has the same
distribution on j’s choices at each level as bi(t
∗
i ). Hence c
∗
i is rational for θ
∗
i . Also,
it follows from Observation 4.2 and Lemmas 4.1 and 4.9 that θ ∗i expresses common
full belief in caution, rationality, and common assumption of prior u and that a good
choice is supported.
(If). Consider Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I corresponding to M
in and c∗i ∈ Ci rational for
some θ ∗i with wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui which expresses common full belief in caution, ratio-
nality, and common assumption of prior u and that a good choice is supported. Con-
sider ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). Since wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui and bi(ti(Ei(θ
∗
i ))) has the same distribution on
j’s choices at each level as βi(θ
∗
i ), c
∗
i is rational for ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )). By Lemmas 4.2 and
4.9, ti(Ei(θ
∗
i )) expresses common full belief in caution and common assumption of
rationality. Therefore, c∗i is iteratively admissible. 
5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 Faithful parallel to Perea and Roy (2017)’s Theorem 6.1
All theorems here can be rephrased as faithful parallels to Perea and Roy (2017)’s
Theorem 6.1, focusing on equivalence between belief hierarchies in complete and
incomplete information models. We adopt the forms here because the coincidence of
belief hierarchies holds by construction, and we think it is unnecessary to mention it
independently.
Also, our proofs are based on constructing a specific correspondence between two
models. It can be seen that this correspondence can be translated directly into prob-
abilistic models and be used to show Perea and Roy (2017)’s Theorem 6.1. Further,
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it can be seen that, by using our Lemma 3.1, belief in rationality under closest utility
function in Perea and Roy (2017) can be replaced by the weaker one (Definition 3.4
(4.2)) here.
5.2 Extending to n-person cases
Both Perea and Roy (2017) and this paper focus on 2-person games. To extend those
results to n-person cases, the problem is how to define the distance between utility
functions and how to relate the distance with the locations of choice-type pairs. In
a 2-person game, a type of i only needs to consider distributions on ∆(C j ×Θ j).
Hence a “cell” in βi(θi) is just a pair (c j,θ j), and its location in βi(θi) can be related
directly to the distance d(w j(θ j),u j). In contrast, in an n-person case a “cell” of a
lexicographic belief contains n− 1 pairs such as
〈(c1,θ1), ...,(ci−1,θi−1),(ci+1,θi+1), ...,(cn,θn)〉 ,
and consequently there are n− 1 distances, i.e.,
d(w1(θ1),u1), ...,d(wi−1(θi−1),ui−1),d(wi+1(θi+1),ui+1), ...,d(wn(θn),un).
Then the problem is how to connect the location of this cell and those distances. We
believe that the results of Perea and Roy (2017) and this paper can be extended to n-
person gameswith a proper definition of the distances and their relation with locations
of “cells” in lexicographic beliefs. Further work is expected in that direction.
5.3 The role of rationality
Rationality has not been used in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 even though in epistemic mod-
els with incomplete information constructed in Section 4.3 each type has a common
full belief in rationality (Observation 4.2). On the other hand, there are also epistemic
models with types satisfying all conditions in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 but not believing
in rationality. Here is an example.
Example 5.1 (Rationality is not satisfied). Consider the gameΓ in Example 4.1 and
the lexicographic epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I with incomplete information
for the corresponding game form where Θ1 = {θ11,θ12,θ13}, Θ2 = {θ21,θ22,θ23},
and
w1(θ11) = u1, β1(θ11) = ((D,θ21),(F,θ22),(E,θ23)),
w1(θ12) = v1, β1(θ12) = ((D,θ21),(F,θ22),(E,θ23)),
w1(θ13) = v
′
1, β1(θ13) = ((D,θ21),(F,θ22),(E,θ23)),
w2(θ21) = v2, β2(θ21) = ((C,θ11),(B,θ12)),(A,θ13)),
w2(θ22) = v
′
2, β2(θ22) = ((C,θ11),(B,θ12)),(A,θ13)),
w2(θ23) = v
′′
2 , β2(θ23) = ((C,θ11),(B,θ12)),(A,θ13)).
where v1,v
′
1,v2,v
′
2 are the same as in Example 4.1 and v
′′
2 is illustrated in Table 11.
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Table 11 An alternative utility function for player 2
v′′2 D E F
A 3 2 1
B 3 2 1
C 6 4 5
It can be seen that θ11 expresses common full belief in caution, u-centered belief
and that a better choice is supported by utilities nearer to u (therefore primary belief in
utilities nearest to u and that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest to u are also
satisfied) but not rationality since, for example, D is not rational for θ21. However,
consider the modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for Γ constructed fromM
in. Indeed, since E1 =
{{θ11,θ12,θ13}} and E2 = {{θ21,θ22,θ23}}, by letting t1 = t1({θ11,θ12,θ13}) and
t2 = t2({θ21,θ22,θ23}), we obtainM
co = (Ti,bi)i∈I for Γ where T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2},
and
b1(t1) = ((D, t2),(F, t2),(E, t2)), b2(t2) = ((C, t1),(B, t1),(A, t1)).
It can be seen that t1 expresses caution and common full belief in respect of prefer-
ences (therefore primary belief in rationality). Further,C is optimal for both θ11 and
t1.
On the other hand, rationality plays a critical role in the characterizations of the
second group. It seems that whether or not using rationality in the characterization
differentiates the two refinements of permissibility within the incomplete information
framework, which corresponds to the fact that, in complete information models, there
is no general relationship between respect of preferences and assumption of rational-
ity (Perea, 2012). It would be interesting that any future research could confirm this
statement or show that proper rationalizability can be characterized with rationality
while iterated admissibility can be done without it.
On the other hand, as shown in the construction in Section 4.3, it is always possi-
ble to construct epistemic models with incomplete information which satisfies ratio-
nality as well as all conditions in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Further, prior belief in u is a
condition between primary belief in u and u-centered belief. Those seem correspond
to the fact within the complete information framework that there is always possible to
construct belief hierarchy which both assumes the opponent’s rationality and respects
the opponent’s preferences (Perea, 2012).
5.4 An ordinal distance on Vi
In this note, we use the Euclidean distance to measure similarity between utility func-
tions. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the Euclidean distance is cardinal. We can de-
fine an ordinal distance as follows to replace it. Let βi be a lexicographic belief on
∆(S j×Θ j). For each vi,ui ∈Vi, define d
βi(vi,ui) = |{{si,s
′
i} : si,s
′
i ∈ Si and the pref-
erence between si and s
′
i under βi at vi are different from that at ui}|. It can be seen
that dβi is a variation of Hamming distance (Hamming, 1950). It measures similarity
between preferences under βi represented by vi and that by ui, i.e., it measures the
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ordinal difference between vi and ui. This does not belong to the group of distances
characterized in Section 3.3 of Perea and Roy (2017) since there is no norm on Vi
to support dβi . Lemma 3.1 still holds under dβi since even if we replace d by dβi
in Lemma 3.1 (c), the constructed utility function sequence in the proof still satis-
fies it. Hence d in Definition 3.4 can be replaced by dβi with appropriate βi and the
characterization results still hold. Also, by replacing rationality under closest utility
function by our Definition 3.4 (4.2), Perea and Roy (2017)’s Theorem 6.1 still holds
under dβi .
5.5 Weakening caution in Theorems 4.3 and 4.4
Caution in Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 can be replaced by a weaker concept called “weak
caution” which is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Weak caution). Consider a game form G = (Ci)i∈I and a lexico-
graphic epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information.
θi ∈ Θi is weakly cautious iff for each c j ∈ C j, there is some θ j ∈ Θ j such that θi
deems (c j,θ j) possible.
Definition 5.1 is weaker than Definition 3.2 since it only requires that each choice
should appear in the belief of θi but does not require that it should be paired with each
belief of j deemed possible by θi. Nevertheless, we will show in Lemma 5.1 that in
with other conditions in this characterization it leads to caution.
Proposition 5.1 (An alternative characterization of permissibility). Consider a
finite 2-person static game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I , the corresponding game form G= (Ci)i∈I ,
and a finite lexicographic epistemic modelMco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for Γ .
Then, c∗i ∈Ci is permissible inM
co if and only if there is some finite lexicographic
epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi,βi)i∈I with incomplete information for G and some
θ ∗i ∈Θi with wi(θ
∗
i ) = ui such that
(a) c∗i is rational for θ
∗
i , and,
(b) θ ∗i expresses common full belief in weak caution, rationality, and primary belief
in u.
The only-if part holds since weak caution is weaker than caution. The if part needs
first to show that weak caution is enough for the characterization. Here, we show that
the corresponding concept in complete information model can replace caution and
characterize permissibility. Then we can use the mapping between complete and in-
complete information models constructed in Section 4.3. Let Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I be a
lexicographic model for Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I with complete information. ti ∈ Ti is weakly
cautious iff for each c j ∈C j, there is some t j ∈ Tj such that ti deems (c j, t j) possible.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 (Characterizing permissibility by weak caution). Consider a lexico-
graphic epistemic model Mco = (Ti,bi)i∈I for a game Γ = (Ci,ui)i∈I . c
∗
i ∈ Ci is per-
missible if and only if it is rational to some t∗i ∈ Ti which expresses common full
belief in weak caution and primary belief in rationality.
Also, we need the following lemmas.
24 Shuige Liu
Lemma 5.2 (Weak cautionin→weak cautionco). LetMin =(Θi,wi,βi)i∈I andM
co =
(Ti,bi)i∈I be constructed from M
in by the above approach. If θi ∈Θi expresses com-
mon full belief in weak caution, so does ti(Ei(θi)).
We omit the proof of Lemma 5.2 since it can be shown in a similar way as Lemma
4.3. It can be seen that Proposition 5.1 follows directly from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.1 and
Theorem 4.3. Similarly, it can be seen that caution in Theorem 4.4 can be replaced
by weak caution.
However, it should be noted that caution cannot be weakened in Theorems 4.1
and 4.2. For Theorem 4.1, caution plays an important role in the proof of the if part;
without it, primary belief in utilities nearest to u and that a best choice is supported
by utilities nearest to u cannot imply primary belief in rationality. For Theorem 4.2,
the interpolation method used in the proof of Lemma 5.1 does not work in general
since different types may have different orders there.
6 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We construct a sequence satisfying (a)-(c) by induction. First,
let vi1 = ui. Suppose that for some ℓ ∈ {1, ...,L− 1} we have defined vi1, ...,viℓ sat-
isfying (a)-(c). Now we show how to define vi,ℓ+1. It can be seen that there ex-
ists Mℓ+1 > 0 such that viℓ(ci,ℓ+1,βi1) +Mℓ+1 > viℓ(ciℓ,βi1) for all ciℓ ∈ Ciℓ and
ci,ℓ+1 ∈Ci,ℓ+1.We define vi,ℓ+1 as follows: for each (ci,c j) ∈C,
vi,ℓ+1(ci,c j) =
{
viℓ(ci,c j)+Mℓ+1 if ci ∈Ci,ℓ+1 and c j ∈ suppβi1
viℓ(ci,c j) otherwise
It can be seen that each ci,ℓ+1 ∈ Ci,ℓ+1 is rational at vi,ℓ+1 under βi. Also, since
d(vi,ℓ+1,viℓ)= (M
2
ℓ+1×|Ci,ℓ+1|×|suppβi1|)
1/2 > 0, d(vi,ℓ+1,ui)= d(vi,ℓ+1,viℓ)+d(vin,ui)>
d(vin,ui). By induction, we can obtain a sequence vi1, ...,viL ∈Vi satisfying (a)-(c).
It should be noted that, given ui and βi, the sequence vi1, ...,viL satisfying (a)-
(c) is not unique. The basic idea behind this inductive construction is depicted as
follows. Suppose that ui(ci1,βi) > ui(ci2,βi) > ... > ui(ciN ,βi), that is, Πi(βi) =
({ci1},{ci2}, ...,{ciN}), then
(ci1,ci2,ci3, ...,ciN) vi2−→
(ci2,ci1,ci3, ...,ciN ,) vi3−→
(ci3,ci2,ci1...,ciN) ... viN−→
(ciN ,ci,N−1, ...,ci1)
Informally speaking, we take equivalent classes of choices one by one to the fore-
most location of the sequence according to the order of preference in ui under βi. The
following example shows how this construction works.
Example 6.1. Consider u1 in Example 2.1. Under the lexicographic belief β1 =
(D,E,F), A is preferred to B and B is preferred toC in u1, that is,Π1(β1)= ({A},{B},{C}).
We can define v11,v12, and v13 as in Table 12.
At v11, the order of preferences is (A,B,C) under β1, at v12 it is (B,A,C), and at
v13 it is (C,B,A).
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if
ti is cautious, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) is also cautious. Let c j ∈ C j and θ j ∈ Θ j(θi).
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Table 12 Alternative utility functions for players 1 corresponding to Π1(β1)
v11 = u1 D E F
A 1 1 1
B 1 1 0
C 1 0 1
−→
v12 D E F
A 1 1 1
B 2 1 0
C 1 0 1
−→
v13 D E F
A 1 1 1
B 2 1 0
C 3 0 1
By construction, it can be seen that the type t j ∈ Tj satisfying the condition that
θ j ∈ Θ j(t j) is in Tj(ti). Since ti is cautious, ti deems (c j, t j) possible. Consider the
pair (c j,θ
′
j) in βi(θi) corresponding to (c j, t j). Since both θ j and θ
′
j are in Θ j(t j),
it follows from Observation 4.1 that β j(θ j) = β j(θ
′
j). Hence (c j,θ
w j(θ
′
j)
j ) is deemed
possible by θi. Here we have shown that θi is cautious.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if ti expresses n-fold full belief in
caution then so does each θi ∈ Θi(ti). Now suppose that ti expresses (n+ 1)-fold
full belief in caution, i.e., each t j ∈ Tj(ti) expresses n-fold full belief in caution. By
construction, for each θi ∈Θi(ti) and each θ j ∈Θ j(θi) there is some t j ∈ Tj(ti) such
that θ j ∈ Θ j(ti), and, by inductive assumption, each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold
full belief in caution. Therefore, each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in
caution.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if ti
primarily believes in j’s rationality, then each θi ∈Θi(ti) primarily believes in utilities
nearest to u. Let (c j ,θ j) be a pair deemed possible in the level-1 belief of θi. Consider
its correspondence (c j, t j) in level-1 belief of ti. Since ti primarily believes in j’s
rationality, c j is rational for t j. It follows that c j ∈C j1 ∈ Π j(t j). By Lemma 2.1 and
construction, it follows that w j(θ j) = u j. Since u j is the nearest function to itself
among all utility functions in V j, we have shown that θi primarily believes in utilities
nearest to u.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if ti expresses n-fold full belief in
primary belief in rationality then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) expresses n-fold full belief in pri-
mary belief in utilities nearest to u. Now suppose that ti expresses (n+ 1)-fold full
belief in primary belief in rationality, i.e., each t j ∈ Tj(ti) expresses n-fold full belief
in primary belief in rationality. Since, by construction, for each θi ∈ Θi(ti) and each
θ j ∈Θ j(θi) there is some t j ∈ Tj(ti) such that θ j ∈Θ j(t j), it follows that, by inductive
assumption, each θ j ∈Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in primary belief in utilities
nearest to u. Therefore, each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in primary
belief in utilities nearest to u. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if
θi is cautious, then ti(Ei(θi)) is also cautious. Let c j ∈ C j and t j ∈ Tj(ti(Ei(θi))).
By construction, t j = t j(E j) for some E j ∈ E j, and there is some θ j ∈ E j which is
deemed possible by θi. Since θi is cautious, there is some θ
′
j with β j(θ
′
j) = β j(θ j),
i.e., θ ′j ∈ E j, such that (c j,θ
′
j) is deemed possible by θi. By construction, (c j, t j) is
deemed possible by ti(Ei(θi)).
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if θi expresses n-fold full belief in
caution then so does ti(Ei(θi)). Now suppose that θi expresses (n+ 1)-fold full be-
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lief in caution, i.e., each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in caution. Since,
by construction, for each t j ∈ Tj(ti(Ei(θi))), there is some θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) such that
t j = t j(E j(θ j)), by inductive assumption t j expresses n-fold full belief in caution.
Therefore, ti(Ei(θi)) expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in caution.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if θi is
cautious, primarily believes in utilities nearest to u, and believes in that a best choice
is supported by utilities nearest to u, then ti(Ei(θi)) primarily believes in j’s rational-
ity. Let (c j, t j) be a choice-type pair which is deemed possible in ti(Ei(θi))’s level-1
belief. By construction t j = t j(E j) for some E j ∈ E j, and for some θ j ∈ E j, (c j,θ j) is
deemed possible in θi’s level-1 belief. Since θi primarily believes in utilities nearest
to u, it follows that
d(w j(θ j),u j)≤ d(w j(θ
′
j),u j) for all θ
′
j ∈ E j. (1)
Suppose that c j is not optimal for t j. Let c
′
j be a choice optimal to t j. Since θi is
cautious, there is some θ
v j
j ∈ E j such that (c j,θ
v j
j ) is deemed possible by θi. Then
since θi believes in that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest to u, it follows
that d(v j,u j) = d(w j(θ
v j
j ),u j)< d(w j(θ j),u j), which is contradictory to (1). There-
fore c j is optimal for t j. Here we have shown that ti(Ei(θi)) primarily believes in j’s
rationality.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if θi expresses n-fold full belief in
caution, primary belief in utilities nearest to u, and that a best choice is supported
by utilities nearest to u, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses n-fold belief in primary belief in
rationality. Now suppose that θi expresses (n+1)-fold full belief in caution, primary
belief in utilities nearest to u, and that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest
to u, i.e., each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in caution, primary belief in
utilities nearest to u, and that a best choice is supported by utilities nearest to u.
Since, by construction, for each t j ∈ Tj(ti(Ei(θi))), there is some θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) such
that t j = t j(E j(θ j)), by inductive assumption t j expresses n-fold full belief in primary
belief in rationality. Therefore, ti(Ei(θi)) expresses (n+1)-fold full belief in primary
belief in rationality.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if
ti is caution and respects j’s preferences, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) expresses u-centered
belief. It can be seen that if ti is cautious and respects j’s preferences, then we can
combine all types deemed possible by ti with the same belief into one type without
hurting the caution and respect of j’s preference, and every choice optimal for ti is still
optimal for this new type and vice versa. Therefore, without loss of generality we can
assume that for each t j, t
′
j ∈ Tj, b j(t j) 6= b j(t
′
j). Let c j,c
′
j ∈C j, θ j ∈Θ j, and v j,v
′
j ∈V j
such that (c j ,θ
v j
j ) and (c
′
j,θ
v′j
j ) are deemed possible by θi with d(v j,u j)< d(v
′
j,u j).
Since each type in Ti has a distinct lexicographic belief, it follows that θ
v j
j ,θ
v′j
j ∈
Θ j(t j) for some t j ∈ Tj. By construction it follows that (1) ti deems both (c j, t j)
and (c′j , t j) possible, and (2) u j(c j, ti)> u j(c
′
j, ti). Since ti respects j’s preferences, ti
deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j, t j), which corresponds to that θi deems
(c j,θ
v j
j ) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j ,θ
v′j
j ). Here we have shown that θi expresses
u-centered belief.
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Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if ti expresses n-fold full belief in
respect of preferences then each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses n-fold full belief in u-centered
belief. Now suppose that ti expresses (n+1)-fold full belief in respect of preferences,
i.e., each t j ∈ Tj(ti) expresses n-fold full belief respect of preferences. Since, by con-
struction, for each θi ∈Θi(ti) and each θ j ∈Θ j(θi) there is some t j ∈ Tj(ti) such that
θ j ∈Θ j(t j), by inductive assumption it follows that each θ j ∈Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold
full belief in u-centered belief. Therefore, each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses (n+1)-fold full
belief in u-centered belief. 
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if θi
is cautious, has a u-centered belief, and believes that a better choice is supported by
utilities nearer to u, then ti(Ei(θi)) respects j’s preferences. First, since θi is cautious,
By Lemma 4.3, ti(Ei(θi)) is also cautious. Let c j,c
′
j ∈C j and t j ∈ Tj(ti(Ei(θi))) with
t j prefers c j to c
′
j. By construction t j = t j(E j) for some E j ∈ E j, and, since θi is
cautious, there are θ j,θ
′
j ∈ E j such that θi deems (c j,θ j) and (c
′
j,θ
′
j) possible. Since
β j(θ j) = β j(θ
′
j) and θ j has the same probability distribution over Ci at each level
as t j, it follows that u j(c j,θ j) > u j(c
′
j,θ j). Since θi believes that a better choice is
supported by utilities nearer to u, it follows that d(w j(θ j),u j)< d(w j(θ
′
j),u j). Since
θi has a u-centered belief, it follows that θi deems (c j,θ j) infinitely more likely than
(c′j,θ
′
j),which implies that ti(Ei(θi)) deems (c j , t j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j, t j).
Therefore, ti(Ei(θi)) respects j’s preferences.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if θi expresses n-fold full belief in
caution, u-centered belief, and that a better choice is supported by utilities nearer to
u, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses n-fold full belief in respect of preferences. Now suppose
that θi expresses (n+1)-fold full belief in caution, u-centered belief, and that a better
choice is supported by utilities nearer to u, i.e., each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold
full belief in caution, u-centered belief, and that a better choice is supported by util-
ities nearer to u. Since, by construction, for each t j ∈ Tj(ti(Ei(θi))), there is some
θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) such that t j = t j(E j(θ j)), by inductive assumption t j expresses n-fold
full belief in respect of preferences. Therefore, ti(Ei(θi)) expresses (n+ 1)-fold full
belief in respect of preferences.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if
ti primarily believes in j’s rationality, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) primarily believes in u.
Let (c j,θ j) be a pair deemed possible in the level-1 belief of θi. Consider its corre-
sponding (c j, t j) in level-1 belief of ti. Since ti primarily believes in j’s rationality,
c j is rational for t j. It follows that c j ∈C j1 ∈ Π j(t j). By construction, it follows that
w j(θ j) = u j. Here we have shown that θi primarily believes in u.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if ti expresses n-fold full belief in
primary belief in rationality then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) expresses n-fold full belief in pri-
mary belief in u. Now suppose that ti expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in primary
belief in rationality, i.e., each t j ∈ Tj(ti) expresses n-fold full belief in primary belief
in rationality. Since, by construction, for each θi ∈Θi(ti) and each θ j ∈Θ j(θi) there is
some t j ∈ Tj(ti) such that θ j ∈Θ j(t j), it follows that, by inductive assumption, each
θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in primary belief in rationality. Therefore,
each θi ∈Θi(ti) expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in primary belief in u. 
Proof of Lemma 4.8. We show this statement by induction. First we show that if θi
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believes in j’s rationality and primarily believes in u, then ti(Ei(θi)) primarily be-
lieves in j’s rationality. Let (c j, t j) be a choice-type pair which is deemed possible in
ti(Ei(θi))’s level-1 belief. By construction t j = t j(E j) for some E j ∈E j , and for some
θ j ∈ E j, (c j,θ j) is deemed possible in θi’s level-1 belief. Since θi primarily believes
in u, it follows that w j(θ j) = u j. Also, since θi believes j’s rationality, it follows that
c j is rational at u j under β j(θ j), i.e., bi(t j). Therefore c j is rational for t j. Here we
have shown that ti(Ei(θi)) primarily believes in j’s rationality.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if θi expresses n-fold full belief in ra-
tionality and primary belief in u, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses n-fold belief in primary be-
lief in rationality. Now suppose that θi expresses (n+1)-fold full belief in rationality
and primary belief in u, i.e., each θ j ∈Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in rationality
and primary belief in u. Since, by construction, for each t j ∈ Tj(ti(Ei(θi))), there is
some θ j ∈Θ j(θi) such that t j = t j(E j(θ j)), by inductive assumption t j expresses n-
fold full belief in primary belief in rationality. Therefore, ti(Ei(θi)) expresses (n+1)-
fold full belief in primary belief in rationality.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. We show this statement by induction. Let θi ∈ Θi(ti). First
we show that if ti assumes in j’s rationality, θi prior assumes u and assumes that
every good choice is supported. Let c j ∈ C j be optimal for some cautious type of
j whose assigned utility function is u j within an epistemic model with incomplete
information. It is easy to see that c j is optimal for its corresponding type, which is
also cautious by Lemma 4.2, in any complete information model constructed from
the one with incomplete information. Since ti assumes j’s rationality, ti deems pos-
sible a cautious type t j for which c j is optimal. By construction, some θ j ∈Θ j(t j) is
deemed possible by θi. Since ti is cautious, (c j, t j) is deemed possible by ti, and, by
construction (c j,θ j1(t j)) is deemed possible by θi. Since w j(θ j1(t j)) = u j and c j is
optimal for θ j1(t j), it follows that θi assumes that every good choice is supported.
Let (c j,θ j) with θ j cautious deemed possible by θi satisfying w j(θ j) = u j and
(c′j,θ
′
j) a pair which does not satisfy that condition. Let (c j , t j) and (c
′
j, t
′
j) be the pairs
occurring in the belief of ti corresponding to (c j,θ j) and (c
′
j,θ
′
j). Since c j is rational
to θ j and w j(θ j) = u j, it follows that c j is optimal for t j. On the other hand, c
′
j is not
optimal for t ′j. Since ti assumes j’s rationality, ti deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely
than (c′j, t
′
j). By construction, θi deems (c j,θ j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j,θ
′
j).
Here we have shown that θi prior assumes u.
Now we show the other direction: suppose that if θi ∈ Θi prior assumes u and
assumes that every good choice is supported, we prove that ti(Ei(θi)) assumes j’s
rationality. Suppose that c j is optimal for some cautious type within some epistemic
model with complete information. It can be seen by construction that c j is optimal
for some cautious type with ui as its assigned utility function within some epistemic
model with incomplete information which corresponds to that complete information
model. Since θi believes in that every good choice is supported, θi deems possible a
cautious type θ j such that w j(θ j) = u j and c j is optimal for θ j. By construction it
follows that ti(Ei(θi)) deems t j(E j(θ j)) possible for which c j is optimal.
Let (c j, t j) with t j cautious be a pair which is deemed possible by ti(Ei(θi)) sat-
isfying that c j is optimal for t j, and (c
′
j, t
′
j) be a pair deemed possible by ti(Ei(θi))
which does not satisfy that condition. Since θi assumes that every good choice is
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supported, there is some θ j ∈Θ j(θi) corresponding to t j with w j(θ j) = u j such that
(c j,θ j) is deemed possible by θi. On the other hand, since θi believes in rationality,
for each θ ′j such that (c
′
j,θ
′
j) is deemed possible by θi, it holds that w j(θ
′
j) 6= u j. Since
θi prior assumes u, θi deems (c j,θ j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j,θ
′
j). It follows that
ti(Ei(θi)) deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j , t
′
j). Here we have shown that
ti(Ei(θi)) assumes j’s rationality.
Suppose that, for some n ∈ N, we have shown that for each k ≤ n,
(n1) if ti ∈ Ti expresses k-fold assumption of rationality, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) ex-
presses k-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported;
(n2) If θi ∈Θi expresses k-fold full belief of rationality and k-fold assumption of prior
u and that every good choice is supported, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses k-fold assumption
of rationality.
Now we show that these two statements hold for n+ 1. First, suppose that ti ∈ Ti
expresses (n+ 1)-fold assumption of rationality. Let c j ∈ C j be a choice of j opti-
mal for some cautious type whose assigned utility function is u j that expresses up
to n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported. Then it is
easy to see that (1) by inductive assumption, in the constructed complete information
model the corresponding type expresses n-fold assumption of rationality, and (2) c j
is optimal for that type. Since ti expresses (n+ 1)-fold assumption of rationality, ti
deems possible a cautious type t j that expresses up to n-fold assumption of rationality
and for which c j is optimal. By construction, it follows that θi deems possible some
θ j ∈Θ j(t j). By inductive assumption it follows that each θ j ∈Θ j(t j) expresses n-fold
assumption of in that every good choice is supported. Since θi expresses common be-
lief in caution and rationality it follows that θi deems (c j,θ j1) for θ j1 ∈Θ j(t j) (that
is, w j(θ j1) = u j).
Let (c j,θ j) with θ j cautious deemed possible by θi satisfying that θ j expresses
up to n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported and
w j(θ j) = u j and (c
′
j,θ
′
j) a pair which does not satisfy those conditions. Let (c j, t j)
and (c′j, t
′
j) be the pairs occurring in the belief of ti corresponding to (c j,θ j) and
(c′j,θ
′
j). Since c j is rational θ j with w j(θ j) = u j, it follows that c j is optimal for t j.
Also, by inductive assumption, it follows that t j expresses up to n-fold assumption of
rationality. On the other hand, it can be seen that (c′j, t
′
j) does not satisfy these con-
ditions. Since ti expresses (n+ 1)-fold of assumptions of rationality, ti deems (c j, t j)
infinitely more likely than (c′j, t
′
j). By construction, θi deems (c j,θ j) infinitely more
likely than (c′j,θ
′
j). Here we have shown that θi expresses (n+1)-fold assumption of
prior u and that every good choice is supported.
Now suppose that θi ∈ Θi expresses (n+ 1)-fold assumption of prior u and that
every good choice is supported. Let c j ∈C j be a choice of j optimal for some cautious
type that expresses to n-fold assumption of rationality. By inductive assumption it
follows that the corresponding type within some incomplete information model also
expresses n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported. It
can be seen that c j is optimal to the constructed type having u j as its utility function
and the type expresses up to n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice
is supported. Then θi deems possible a type θ j with w j(θ j) = u j for player j which
expresses up to n-fold assumption of prior u and that every good choice is supported
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for which c j is optimal. By inductive assumption it follows that ti(Ei(θi)) deems
possible t j(E j(θ j)) which expresses n-fold assumption of rationality and for which
c j is optimal.
Let (c j , t j) be a pair with t j cautious deemed possible by ti(Ei(θi)) where t j ex-
presses up to n-fold assumption of rationality and c j is optimal for t j, and let (c
′
j, t
′
j)
be a pair that does not satisfy this property. It can be seen that there is some θ j cor-
responding to t j such that θ j is cautious and expresses up to n-fold assumption of
prior u and that every good choice is supported and w j(θ j) = u j,while (c
′
j,θ
′
j) does
not satisfy this property for any θ ′j deemed possible by θi since θi expresses n-fold
full belief of rationality. Therefore ti(Ei(θi)) deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely than
(c′j, t
′
j). Here we have shown that ti(Ei(θi)) expresses (n+ 1)-fold assumption of ra-
tionality.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. The only-if part holds automatically. To show the if part, we
need first to show that each weak cautious type can be extended into a cautious one
without changing the set of choices rational for it. It is done by an interpolation
method as follows. Let ti be a type satisfying weak caution with bi(ti) = (bi1, ...,biK),
c j ∈C j, and t j ∈ Tj(ti). Suppose that (c j, t j) is not deemed possible by ti. Since ti is
weakly cautious, there is some t ′j ∈ Tj such that for some k∈ {1, ...,K}, bik(c j, t
′
j)> 0.
Now we extend (bi1, ...,biK) into (b
′
i1, ...,b
′
i,K+1) by letting (1) b
′
it = bit for each t ≤ k,
(2) b′it = bi,t−1 for each t > k+ 1, and (3) b
′
i,k+1 is obtained by replacing every
occurrence of (c j, t
′
j) by (c j, t j) in the distribution of bik. We call b
′
i,k+1 a doppel-
ganger of bik. It can be seen that for each ci ∈ Ci, and a doppelganger b
′
i,k+1 of bik,
ui(ci,b
′
i,k+1) = ui(ci,bik). By repeatedly interpolating doppelgangers into bi(ti) for
each missed choice-type pairs, finally we obtain a lexicographic belief (b′i1, ...,b
′
iK′
)
that satisfies caution. We use ti to denote the type with belief (b
′
i1, ...,b
′
iK′
). t i is called
a cautious extension of ti.We have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 (Extended type preserves rational choices). Let ti be a weakly cautious
type and t i a cautious extension of ti. Then ci ∈Ci is rational for ti if and only if it is
rational for t i.
Proof. (Only-if) Suppose that ci is not rational for ti. Then there is some c
′
i ∈ Ci
which is preferred ci under bi(t i) = (b
′
i1, ...,b
′
iK′
), that is, there is some k′ ∈ {0, ...,K′}
such that ui(ci,b
′
iℓ) = ui(c
′
i,b
′
iℓ) for each ℓ ≤ k
′ and ui(ci,bi,k′+1)< ui(c
′
i,bi,k′+1). Let
bi,k+1 be the entry in bi(ti) such that b
′
i,k′+1 is its doppelganger. It follows that in the
original bi(ti) = (bi1, ...,biK), ui(ci,biℓ) = ui(c
′
i,biℓ) for each ℓ≤ k and ui(ci,bi,k+1)<
ui(c
′
i,bi,k+1). Hence ci is not rational for ti.
(If) Suppose that ci is not rational for ti. Then there is some c
′
i ∈ Ci which is
preferred ci under bi(ti) = (bi1, ...,biK), that is, there is some k ∈ {0, ...,K} such
that ui(ci,biℓ) = ui(c
′
i,biℓ) for each ℓ≤ k and ui(ci,bi,k+1)< ui(c
′
i,bi,k+1). Let b
′
i,k′+1
be the corresponding doppelganger in bi(t i) to bi,k+1. It follows that in the original
ui(ci,b
′
iℓ) = ui(c
′
i,b
′
iℓ) for each ℓ ≤ k
′ and ui(ci,b
′
i,k′+1) < ui(c
′
i,b
′
i,k′+1). Hence ci is
not rational for ti. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1 (Continued) Since caution implies weak caution, the only-if
part holds automatically. For the if part, suppose that c∗i is rational for some t
∗
i ∈ Ti
which expresses common full belief in weak caution and primary belief in rational-
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ity. Consider an epistemic model (T i,bi)i∈I such that for each i ∈ I, T i = {t i : ti ∈ Ti}
and bi(ti) is a cautious extension of bi(ti) with replacing each occurrence of t j by t j.
By Lemma 6.1, since c∗i is rational for t
∗
i , it is also rational for t
∗
i . Also, it can be
seen by construction that t∗i expresses common full belief in caution. Also, since the
interpolation always put doppelgangers after the original one, it does not change the
level-1 belief, and consequently t∗i expresses common full belief in primary belief in
rationality. Therefore, c∗i is permissible.
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